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Safety concerns over the use of molecular biotechnology in the improvement of crops has generated substantial, heated
and confusing debates, often driven by ideology and hysterics. Modification of crops is not new, and biotechnology (in its
broadest sense) has been used for over a century to accelerate the development of new crops for food, feed and fibre, so as to
meet the demands of a growing global community. The introduction of crops developed via molecular biotechnology
[Genetically Modified Crops (GMCs)] represents the latest step in this inexorable innovative progression of technology.
However, misinformed concern has led to a broad embrace of the Precautionary Principle as a regulatory paradigm for
GMCs, such that research, development and deployment are delayed, hindered or outright halted. Although of possible use
in limited applications, the Precautionary Principle is likely impracticable, as it posits an untenable philosophical paradox of
proving the negative proposition that GMCs will never be unsafe. If such a position is accepted, then any technological
process can be permanently stymied. To date, empirical observations indicate that there have been no documented problems
associated with GMCs. On the contrary, all of the documented fiascos have been due to conventional ‘biotechnology’, e.g.,
mad cow disease, virus contaminated vaccines and the development of toxic crops via conventional plant breeding.
Therefore, regulation of GMCs, whether in the United States or in Europe, should move away from a process/method focus
and to a product risk/benefit analysis, that is, a case-by-case evaluation of any new organism, regardless of as to how it was
developed, or (as in the case of introduced exotic plants) if it even was the product of biotechnology. A rationally based, risk
assessment, risk management paradigm appears to be a far better regulatory approach, especially in the light of empirical
determination of actual risks and benefits.
Keywords: Biotechnology, regulation, precautionary principle, risk analysis, genetically modified crops, genetic
engineering, plant breeding

The debate over the research, development and
deployment of GMCs in agriculture has all too often
been characterized by polarizing emotion-laden
tirades, rather than reasoned, and reasonable,
discussions. Virtually, there are risks and benefits
associated with the use of modern methods of
molecular biotechnology, e.g. DNA modification,
cloning and transformation, in crop improvement.
This paper will attempt to sort through the debate, and
arrives at a reasonable proposition for how GMCs can
be developed, regulated and used, with minimal risk
and maximal benefit. For the purposes of this paper,
GMCs are defined as crops developed, improved or
otherwise modified via application of modern
methods of molecular biotechnology, as so defined
immediately hereinabove.
Risks and Benefits of GMCs
In order to coherently discuss how to rationally
regulate GMCs, it is prudent to establish what the
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known risks and benefits actually (and not
theoretically) are. This can then function as a
reference baseline, from which to formulate
recommendations for policies that are grounded in
reality and not emotional, political or agenda-driven
discourse; wishful thinking, conjecture or paranoia
should not unduly influence, or possibly even
overwhelm, this already complicated process.
Therefore, it is hoped that this detailed listing of what
is known about the risks and benefits of GMCs, that is
to say a comprehensive risk/benefit accounting, can
then serve as a point of reference as the thesis of the
discussion is developed.
Risks of Using GMCs

The potential risks of GMCs include: Migration of
transgenes into non-targeted organisms, increased
creation of resistant weeds and pests, potential
adulteration of foods, non-target pest impacts, crop
plant and biodiversity impacts1, GMCs overwhelming
an ecosystem, negative impacts on the environment,
e.g. soil bacteria, fungi, etc.,2 GMCs and metabolic
imbalances3 and antibiotic resistance.4

KOWALSKI: RATIONAL RISK/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS

The migration of transgenes into non-targeted
organisms poses dilemma of contamination of nongenetically modified species with pollen from GMCs,
provided that the two are, in fact, cross-compatible,
i.e. can successfully set seed. One of the potential
scenarios suggested is that the errant transgenes will
become incorporated into cross-compatible weed
species, e.g. sorghum pollen finding its way to the
closely related noxious weed, Johnson grass, and
thereby increasing its fitness potential as an
aggressively invasive weed species. However, viable
species-species cross-fertilization is a very rare
occurrence, and the likelihood that such gene transfer
will confer additional fitness on the part of the weed
seems remote.
Regarding the generation of totally new weeds
from the incorporation of errant genes (a previously
innocuous plant suddenly becoming a ‘super-weed’),
it is important to realize that weediness in plants is not
simply conferred by one, or two genes. On the contrary, there are over ten phenotypic traits associated
with conferring the characteristic of weediness, with
multiple genes involved (a polygenic trait). Hence, it
seems quite unlikely that a stray gene would cause a
complex phenotypic manifestation such as
weediness.5 It is also similarly unlikely that the GMC
itself would achieve invasive weedy status due to the
incorporation of one, or two, genes. Crops are
typically poorly adapted to survival without intensive
inputs; over the centuries they have been specifically
bred for production. A few ‘volunteer’ plants (e.g.
corn seedlings) might still be present in a field for a
year or two, but do not long persist, and are incapable
of sustained competitive survival against established
weeds. Actually the real threat is the introduction of
invasive exotic species, often-wild relatives of
cultivated species, which can truly wreak havoc. For
example, highly noxious and toxic soda apple, an
introduced exotic species that has spread throughout
the southern United States, is a wild relative of the
cultivated potato. It produces green berries similar in
appearance to striped watermelons but much smaller,
only the size of golf balls.6 These berries, which cattle
love to munch on, contain a toxic alkaloid compound.
It is difficult to imagine how one or two genes could
transform a cultivated potato into something
resembling the truly dreadful soda apple, and it is
correspondingly perplexing why regulatory oversight
concerns for introduced invasive exotic species is so
often not prioritized to the level of that for GMCs.7
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Nevertheless, for every GMC introduced, the
National Research Council has recommended that
criteria should include what the related wild relatives
are, and what the impact of potential risks might be.
Relevant criteria to consider include whether the
specific crop is cross pollinating or self-pollinating,
the nature of the trait that has been genetically
engineered, and the natural occurrence of wild species
that could be targets of genetically modified pollen,
for example, Johnson grass endemic to a region set
for deployment of the genetically modified sorghum.1
A similar potential scenario has been suggested for
genetically modified rice, i.e. gene flow from the
transgenic rice to a closely related wild species,
thereby conferring a fitness advantage (e.g. herbicide
tolerance).8 This sort of scenario could be a legitimate
cause for concern when a GMC is grown in proximity
to closely related wild relatives (a crop’s center of
origin), for example, genetically modified rice
cultivated in regions of South East Asia. However,
empirical observations indicate that, after over twenty
years of cultivation, herbicide resistance genes from
canola, wheat and soybean (incorporated by nonmolecular ‘conventional’ plant breeding techniques)
have not caused any problems.9 A more likely
possibility for the generation of herbicide resistant
weeds may be prolonged application of herbicides to
vast populations of weeds creating intense artificial
selection, that while unlikely (less than one in a
quintillion), nevertheless could occur with both
conventional cropping systems and with the
cultivation of GMCs.10
As with the possibility of creation of herbicide
resistant weeds, there may be a potential risk
associated with the deployment of GMCs pertaining
to the generation of insecticide resistant pests. The
possibility of herbicide genes jumping from sorghum
to Johnson grass, or from cultivated to wild rice, may
be analogized to similar scenarios, i.e. gene migration
from GMCs into insect pests and pathogenic
microorganisms, e.g. fungal, bacterial, viral, pests.
However, as these species become increasingly
taxonomically remote from the GMC, so the
likelihood of species-to-species genetic transfer also
becomes remote.1
Adulteration of foods is a potential risk of GMCs
that worries many consumers. This worry has been
particularly acute in Europe. Two areas of tangible
concern are the presence of allergens and toxins.
Allergens pose a very real threat, and the engineering
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of Brazil nut genes into soybean illustrates just how
serious this can become. On the other hand, toxins,
such as the anti-lepidopteron Bt toxin widely
engineered into maize and cotton, may present risks
of only long-term toxicity; however, with this present
generation of engineered toxins such risks appear
minimal. In spite of that, future advances in
genetically engineered toxicants should be monitored
for both short and long term toxicity.1
Non-target pest impacts, widely popularized by the
scientifically challenged report that Bt toxin kills
monarch butterflies, is a concern raised by the
National Research Council, but with certain caveats.
The most compelling caveat is the recommendation
that the impact of GMCs, engineered with insect
resistance genes, be carefully compared to the impact
that wide-spectrum chemical insecticides currently in
use have. For example, it is possible, albeit unlikely,
that maize pollen containing Bt toxin will kill certain
non-target lepidopteron larvae, e.g. monarch butterfly
caterpillars. But when balanced against the
widespread, species-wide devastation wrought by
spraying a field with a broad-spectrum insecticide,
analogous to a poison gas attack, the deployment of
Bt engineered maize or cotton appears relatively
benign.1
Crop plants and biodiversity impacts relate to the
potential for GMCs to come to dominate commercial
agriculture, to the point of marginalizing and even
eliminating other varieties, cultivars and related
germplasm. Then again, this has been a problem for
centuries with modern commercialized agriculture;
the rise of GMCs in agricultural production is just
another step in the growing consolidation and
uniformity of modern crop production. The antiquity
of this issue is now legendary: The Irish potato famine
was the result of cultivating a single potato clone
(notorious ‘lumper’ variety) across the whole of the
Emerald Isle. This variety was uniform in its high
yield, hence the rapid increase in the Irish population
(from 4M-8M between 1750 and 1845), but also quite
uniform in its susceptibility to fungal pathogens,
hence the subsequent decline in the Irish population
(from 8M-4M between 1845 and 1900).11 Such
erstwhile crop failures exemplify the continuing need
for careful monitoring of uniform stands of crops,
whether they are genetically modified or developed
via more conventional technologies.1
More generalized environmental and ecosystem
risks also exist with GMCs. GMCs may present the

risk of overwhelming an ecosystem by affecting nontarget organisms in ways that are non-specific and
thus difficult to predict. Negative impacts on the
environment, e.g. soil bacteria, fungi, and the soil
itself might result. This might arise due to interspecific gene transfer or by other biological
mechanisms still to be determined.2
Genetic modification of crops via molecular
cloning could lead to metabolic imbalances with
results that are both difficult to predict and farreaching. Manipulation of plant genomes might cause
system-wide disruptions, either at the level of DNA
expression or at the complex level of plant secondary
metabolism. The intricate regulation of the plant’s
biosynthetic apparatus could thereby be thrown out of
kilter, with the potential accumulation in the plant of
toxins, e.g. various alkaloids, allergens, e.g. various
proteins, or even a reduction in the plant’s overall
nutritional value.3 However, this is still in the realm of
educated speculation, and hard empirical evidence
must be forthcoming in order to substantiate these
sorts of concerns.
Antibiotic resistance is the final risk concern as to
GMCs. In the generation of molecular clones to be
inserted into plant DNA, i.e. genetic engineering,
several antibiotic resistance genes are employed as
markers. The most commonly used are kannamycin
and neomycin resistance genes. The principal risk
concern is gene transfer from plant to microbe.
However, this is not known to happen in nature.
Furthermore, the commonly used antibiotics used,
kannamycin and neomycin, have limited clinical
value.4
Benefits of Using GMCs

The benefits of GMCs include: A general reduction
in the use of chemical pesticides needed, the
introduction of disease resistance into crops that were
previously susceptible to virulent pathogens, an
improvement in stewardship of soil resources,12 an
overall increase in yields, a net savings in time and
cost to farmers, and finally, no known detrimental
environmental impact.13 As in the preceding section,
each of these will be briefly discussed in turn.
Deployment of GMCs has led to a general
reduction in the use of chemical pesticides needed and
deployed,2 overall estimated to be in the tens of
millions of pounds.13 Cotton is the most highly
sprayed crop in the United States. The introduction of
Bt-engineered Bollgard® cotton has contributed to a
significant reduction in the application of pesticides in
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the United States, an approximate 850,000 gallons
between 1996 and 1999.2 Some of the beneficial
results of reduced pesticide usage include cleaner
groundwater, less pollution of ecosystems, and
decreased accumulation of pesticide runoff in oceanic
ecosystems. In Australia, a 30% reduction in pesticide
use as been attributed to the successful deployment of
GMCs.12
The introduction of disease resistance into crops
that were previously susceptible to virulent pathogens
is another benefit of GMCs.2 This application of
biotechnology can have a significantly positive
impact in developing countries. For example, papaya
ringspot virus has had a devastating impact on papaya
production in Brazil. In the 1990s, Brazil (the world’s
leading producer of papaya) deployed genetically
engineered papaya lines which are resistant to the
papaya ringspot virus, thereby preserving this
valuable commodity in the Brazilian economy.14 Such
an application of biotechnology is a cost-effective
remedy for a crisis where few, if any, other feasible
control measures exist.
Use of GMCs can contribute to an improvement in
stewardship of soil resources.12 Typically, less time is
required in the field for either tillage (weed control) or
boom-spray applications (insect, disease control).
Hence, there is less soil compaction from tractor tires,
less soil erosion from wind and water, and less
disruption of the soil’s ecosystem. Soil stewardship
can also, in an indirect yet tangible way, contribute to
conserving biodiversity. Specifically, by improving
soil management and increasing agricultural
production on existing farmland, the trend towards
continuing expansion of agriculture into marginal
areas will be lessened, thereby curtailing ongoing
aggressive deforestation with the concomitant
destruction of possibly irreplaceable biodiversity.15
And finally, an overall increase in yields has been
attributed to GMCs: Genetically modified rice in
South East Asia, with 25% yield increase; genetically
modified maize in Mexico, with 40% yield increase;
genetically modified potatoes in Peru, with increased
yields due to enhanced resistance to potato blight;2
genetically modified cotton in Argentina, China,
India, Mexico and South Africa, all showing
increased yields, lower pesticide use, higher net
return;16 genetically modified canola in Canada, with
up to 30% higher yield returns when compared to the
performance of conventional varieties.12
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Risks of Not Using GMCs

Professor Drew Kershen has put forward a novel
idea as to risk/benefit analysis of GMCs. He has
examined the risks of not using GMCs, and seeks to
provide balance to the discussion by adding this side
of the argument. Several examples from Professor
Kershen’s paper are:17
First, aflatoxins are potent toxic compounds
produced by fungi that infest cereal grains, producing
a moldy grain that is highly toxic. Ingestion of these
toxins can lead to hepatic or throat cancer and
premature death. The primary means by which cereal
grains become infested with aflatoxin producing fungi
is via insect vectors, much the same way as
mosquitoes spread malaria to humans. However, Btengineered grain is resistant to these insects, and
hence by not deploying this resistance, the risk of
aflatoxin contamination of grain, as well as milk
produced by cows that consume this tainted grain,
increases.17
Second, use of toxic pesticides instead of GMCs
with Bt based resistance in potatoes can result in the
contamination of ground water with environmental
and social impacts following. Some of these chemical
insecticides are organophosphate nerve toxins, lethal
to fish, and highly toxic to humans.17
The third example deals with chicken manure
accumulation and its negative impact on the
environment. Phosphorous in chicken manure is
present primarily in the bound form of phytic acid;
chickens cannot digest phytic acid because they lack
the phytase enzyme. However, this enzyme can be fed
to chickens so that they are then able to digest the
phytic acid and thereby utilize the liberated free
phosphorous. If phytic acid is not digested, it is
passed in the manure, and thereupon becomes the
principal source of phosphorous pollution in fresh
water, often resulting in waterways clogged with
swaths of green scummy algae. Therefore, reluctance
to use maize engineered with phytase genes (and
hence with endogenous phytase) as poultry feed, due
to public outcry against GMCs, will only amplify the
risk of resulting heavy phosphorous leaching from the
uneasy loads of chicken manure that accumulate next
to the chicken processing plants, and the inevitable
pollution of precious fresh water.17
The several examples noted underscore the point
that the added risk is societal, and that adoption of a
blind precautionary principle approach will cripple
science-based risk assessment and management.17
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Benefits of Not Using GMCs

In addition, there may be benefits of not using
GMCs, for example, a reintroduction of biodiversity
in crops, that is, reduction of use of highly uniform
commercial varieties and cultivars, e.g. the Monsanto
soybean varieties, with the concomitant reintroduction
of landraces and heirloom varieties; although these
may be only of limited marketable applicability at the
commodity level, i.e. niche markets, in an economy
that demands cheap, high quality food for its
enormous urban centres. Another possible benefit of
not using GMCs would be a generalized reduction in
public paranoia vis-à-vis the makeup of the food
supply; although such a benefit might only be
dubious, at best.
Risk Assessment, Risk Management and the
Precautionary Principle
Externalities analysis is part of an overall risk
appraisal in agricultural biotechnology and the
deployment of GMCs. ‘Externalities created by
spread of certain of these new gene-forms raise issues
of both private and public nuisance.’18 As per Van
Cleve, externalities are:
environmental and social impacts which are not
reflected in the price of goods and services. There
are many ways that these impacts can be
recognized – for example, through strategic
environmental assessment or life cycle assessment.
Full account should be taken of hidden or neglected
environmental and social factors in the decisionmaking at policy, business and individual levels.
They should be identified, quantified, and when
possible given a monetary value.1
It is a general principle in the United States, that
those who create unwanted externalities bear the brunt
of the responsibility that said externalities generate.
Similarly, in Europe, the general principle is that
polluter pays.1 With regard to GMCs and the concept
of externalities, the question raised is whether the
risks associated with these new crops are acceptable
or unacceptable, that is, whether the externalities are
of any legal significance. Examples of externalities
include contamination of the food supply with
genetically modified food (the StarLink problem),
genetically modified pollen drift, the emergence of
killer weeds, and the list could go on and on, as per
the aforementioned risks of GMCs. The type of
analysis requisite to make this determination is the
emerging challenge.

Application of the Precautionary Principle is one
suggested prophylactic approach to the crop
biotechnology
externalities
dilemma.
The
Precautionary Principle has been defined and
redefined: ‘[The Precautionary Principle seeks] to
impose early preventative measures to ward off even
those risks for which we have little or no basis on
which to predict the future probability of harm.’19 Or,
to put it even more opaquely, ‘When there is scientific
uncertainty regarding an issue that could have serious,
long-term effects, the lack of scientific certainty
should not stand in the way of preventing these
efforts.’20 Indeed, this is a simply enunciated, yet
complicatedly implemented proposition. Or, as
Jeremy Leggett of Greenpeace has defined it: ‘The
modus operandi is: ‘do not admit a substance unless
you have proof that it will do no harm to the
environment’’. Which presents us with the
uncomfortable philosophical dilemma of proving a
negative proposition.21 Or, as the US Chamber of
Commerce has so defined: ‘The Precautionary
Principle says that when the risks of a particular
activity are unclear or unknown, assume the worst and
avoid activity. It is essentially a policy of risk
avoidance.’22 The Precautionary Principle has been
incorporated into international agreements, including
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and
the Cartagena Protocol (connected to the CBD), and it
has also been applied to policy and regulatory issues
in many countries.23
According to Applegate, the Precautionary
Principle can be broken down into four subcomponents:24
1

2

3

4

The trigger: This incorporates an anticipated
serious or irreversible harm and minimal
scientific information as to the basis of said harm.
Timing: This sets regulatory actions in motion
even before solid proof of a relationship is shown
between the action and the projected harm, hence
timing is anticipatory, addressing not only known,
but also unknown risks.
Response: This defines what type of regulatory
response follows, e.g. outright bans on the GMC,
process controls such as isolation of fields,
additional testing, alternative technologies, further
research.
Iteration: As additional information becomes
available as to a specific GMC, the response step
should be periodically reviewed and appropriate
changes made as to the regulatory provisions.

KOWALSKI: RATIONAL RISK/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS

GMCs could fit into this scheme of the
Precautionary Principle. There is a trigger
mechanism, that is, the proffered list of risks, some of
which could be viewed as potentially serious. As for
timing, the plethora of potential interactions between
GMCs and the environment, as exemplified by their
complexity and novelty, suggests that the potential
magnitude of risks requires timely action. By setting a
regulatory scheme appropriate to the perceived risk,
the response prong can be directly applied to GMCs.
Finally as for iteration, as new information becomes
available, the regulatory mechanisms can be more
accurately tailored to fit the GMC under review.24
However, the Precautionary Principle may have
serious limitations as to practicable implementation,
e.g. in at least one recent case the Precautionary
Principle has arguably run amok. The governmental
rejection of genetically modified maize in Zambia and
Zimbabwe, as too hazardous to feed even starving
people, was a stunningly catastrophic application of
the Precautionary Principle.25 Calling the UN-donated
maize ‘poison’, the governments rejected the maize,
in the face of looming famine.26 However, this ultra
cautious …bordering on paranoid, application of the
Precautionary Principle was at least partially driven
by the warranted fear that the European export
markets would close their doors to any Zimbabwean
or Zambian produced maize that might be tainted with
genetically modified kernels, i.e. the imports doors
would be slammed shut because the corn could not be
proven ‘safe’.27 In this case, the precautionary ‘cure’
creates a human calamity.
Europe’s embrace of the precautionary principle,
which amounts to hyper-caution, could lead to longterm non-use of GMCs with long-term consequences
that are difficult to predict. As illustrated all too well
with the Zimbabwean/Zambian rejection of possible
GMCs (‘contaminated’ corn), the realities of
globalization and world food market integration can
drive agendas far from where they arise.28 GMCs
have the potential of providing the poor of developing
countries with affordable, high quality food, feed and
fibre; yet, this potential may be truncated due to strict
regulatory systems thousands of miles to the north.29
The loving embrace of the Precautionary Principle in
its purer form by the Europeans has had a disquieting
impact on the poor of Sub-Saharan Africa, and is
disturbingly reminiscent of previous European
interactions with the African continent, i.e. a twisted
politically correct neocolonialism. As aptly stated by
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Professor Paarlberg, ‘Instead of helping Africa’s
hungry grow more food, European donors are helping
them grow more regulations’.30 Of course, it is ironic
to note that a healthy diet of non-GMC food can lead
to obesity as readily as that from GMC derived
ingredients, and the resultant obesity-driven epidemic
in developed countries31 has created sustained demand
for high quality insulin, which, amazingly, is nearly
entirely produced using recombinant human insulin
(industrial biotechnology at its finest).32 No one seems
to complain about this particular genetically modified
product.
As already alluded to hereinabove, the
Precautionary Principle may be grounded in a
philosophical proposition that is unworkable: Proving
a
negative
proposition.21
Furthermore,
the
Precautionary Principle may be based on a series of
propositions of suspect rationality. As such, the
Precautionary Principle may be inadequate, based on
misapplication of fundamental human cognition.
Sunstein has listed five such propositions, and
suggested that each is problematic:33
Loss Aversion,

that is, people dislike loss, and, in a
deep psychological way, view the status quo as
safe, without adequately considering possible
benefits of new technology. However, taken to the
extreme, humans would still be squabbling with
hyenas over the rotten scraps of a lioness’s kill.
Myth of a Benevolent Nature (the ‘Mother Nature’
syndrome), informs that nature is safe, healthy and
that new technologies are risky human
interventions with the ‘balance’ of nature, hence
proceeding from the paradigm that nature exists in
a stasis and is not dynamic.
Availability Heuristic, holds out some risks as far
greater than they actually are, simply because they
are available, that is, brought to the fore of the
argument, whereas other risks, i.e. Kershen’s risks
of not using GMCs remain in the shadows.
Probability Neglect, is similar to the availability
heuristic, in that there is a disproportionate
consideration of which risks are more probable,
such that focusing on negligible risks precludes
consideration of other, possibly greater,
countervailing risks.
System Neglect, is the summation of the four factors,
which as a group, impact the regulatory system
such that externalities are improperly evaluated and
decisions are made without a proper risk/benefit
analysis.
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Susntein further points out that the anxiety of
understanding, and accepting, the inevitability of risk
might be at the heart of the embracement of the
Precautionary Principle as a ‘safe’, albeit delusional,
alternative. Ironically, in certain circumstances,
GMCs might be safer than traditionally bred34 or even
organically growncrops,33 as will be discussed
hereinbelow.35
Possibly one of the greatest limitations of the
Precautionary Principle is that it fails to take into
account that any decision carries an attendant burden
of risk. Risk management is about identifying and
controlling risk. However, when institutionalized, the
Precautionary Principle essentially abrogates this
option, and thereby plunges head first into an abyss of
unknown risk. Any decision, even a decision to not
use biotechnology, involves risk. Decision-making is
inherently a risk associated process, and a balancing
of risks and benefits, based on empirical evaluation, is
a realistic, and rational, approach. Unfortunately, the
Precautionary Principle, as comforting as it can be,
will not remove us from this fundamental dilemma.
Hence, the Precautionary Principle when applied to
regulations often generates a lopsided decisionmaking process.36 It is based on the flawed
assumption that hindering, or even blocking, the entry
of advanced technology into the marketplace carries
little attendant risk, i.e. the decision not to decide is
harmless. In so amplifying the dangers, and
minimizing the benefits, of a new technology, the
longer-term potential of innovative advances, e.g.
agricultural biotechnology, for addressing pressing
societal and humanitarian needs is extinguished. If
such a version of the Precautionary Principle had been
firmly established in 1750, this would indeed be a
very different world, with, for example, rampant
infectious disease, chronic malnutrition and many
other types of human misery that no rational human
would wish for.
A balanced, logical and rational approach, in order
to temper the Precautionary Principle’s skewness, will
permit externalities to be sensibly analysed via a
system of Risk Assessment and Risk Management.
Risk Assessment ‘describes a precise probabilistic
estimate of the potentially harmful effect of the intake
of or exposure to a substance, determined in
accordance with scientifically accepted methodology.’
Risk Management ‘is a political and value-based
decision, which considers the result of risk assessment
and subsequently determines how high a level of risk

society is willing to tolerate and which measures to
take to control the risk in question.’37 As it currently
stands, an over-extended version of the Precautionary
Principle weakens science since it advocates the use
of non-scientific criteria.37 However, depending on
how one interprets the extent of the Precautionary
Principle, whether over-extended or rationally
balanced, it may not necessarily be inconsistent with
risk assessment and management tenets.38 Based on
sound scientific principles, there should be a way to
evaluate and regulate the potential externalities
attendant to GMCs.
Comparative Risks of GMCs: A Scientist’s
Perspective
An important question to address is how the
ongoing discussions as to GMCs and their safety
relate to the precedent scientific paradigm. In other
words, how do the known risks and documented
hazards as to GMCs that have already been developed
compare to other types of biotechnologically
generated plants, animals or pharmaceuticals? Note
that for the purposes of this discussion, the term
‘biotechnologically’ is used in the broadest sense of
the word, that is, the official USDA definition of ‘the
use of living organisms to solve problems or make
useful products.’4 Only when such a comparison is
rationally made, can the potential risks of GMCs be
put into perspective.
From a historical perspective, past advances in
biotechnology were also viewed with fear, anxiety
and suspicion, e.g. modern genetics, cross-species
breeding and radiation induced mutational breeding
all had critics. A notable example was the great plant
breeder Luther Burbank, who in 1906, perhaps
overcautiously, uttered the now famous warning:
‘[w]e recently advanced our knowledge of genetics to
the point where we can manipulate life in a way never
intended by nature. We must proceed with utmost
caution in the application of this new found
knowledge’.39 However, the 100-year long record of
crop improvements made via genetics techniques has
generated a cornucopia of benefits and a handful of
known risks.
As of 2001, no harmful, toxic effects on mammals
have been found by feeding them the products derived
from GMCs.35 This was reiterated more recently by
the FAO in 2004: ‘To date, no verifiable untoward
toxic or nutritionally deleterious effects resulting from
the consumption of foods derived from genetically
modified foods have been discovered anywhere in the
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world.’ (citing the UN FAO 2003-2004 report on
the State of Food and Agriculture).12,16 Similarly,
although potential threats of allergenicity have been
identified, e.g. the brazil nut protein expressed in
genetically engineered soybean, there have not been
any verifiable allergic reactions clearly attributable to
proteins expressed in GMCs.35 This should not,
however, lull us into disregarding the arising of
potential allergens; appropriate testing should be
available to adequately ascertain the potential for
allergenicity of any novel proteins expressed in
GMCs.35 The brazil nut protein example can serve as
a useful guide for this specific purpose.
Where
have
the
most
notorious
of
biotechnologically produced organism fiascos
occurred (hint: not with GMCs)? Six of the most
famous are worth noting:
The polio vaccine and SV-40 contamination (SV =
simian virus) stands as one of the single most
arresting fiascos. In the early 1960s, the polio
vaccine had been enthusiastically administered to
100 million Americans. However, around the same
time it was discovered that approximately 20% of
the administered vaccine had been contaminated
with live SV-40, a troubling discovery since
compelling empirical evidence had demonstrated
that SV-40 was a causative cancer agent in
humans.40
The recently notorious bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy, i.e. ‘mad -cow disease’ which has
been shown to be the causative agent of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans41, has been
attributed to extraordinarily poor animal husbandry
practices:
cattle-feed
formulations
were
supplemented with contaminated ruminant-derived
proteins, in other words, cannibalism in cattle,
which then led to a drastic multiplier effect of the
causative factors, likely to be prions.42
Dioxin-tainted chicken presented a food scare,
similar to that caused by mad-cow disease.4 The
fourth and fifth examples are arguably more
relevant to the scope of this paper, in that they deal
with the ‘old’ biotechnology of plant breeding, and
what can go wrong with this traditional method of
crop improvement.
The Lenape Potato Variety was developed via
conventional plant breeding, by crossing the
domesticated potato (Solanum tuberosum) with a
wild relative (Solanum chacoense). The resulting
variety had marvelous insect resistance, produced
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beautifully white potato chips (albeit slightly bitter
to the taste), and contained toxic levels of alkaloids
that can cause significant gastrointestinal distress.
Similar to the Lenape saga, a celery variety,
conventionally bred, was found to accumulate toxic
levels of linear furanocoumarins, known to cause
phyto-photo-dermatitis.35 Verily, but perhaps not
surprisingly, ‘new varieties developed by
traditional crossing appear somewhat more likely
to show human toxicity than transgenic varieties.’35
The needs and problems of developing countries,
where, in Africa, cassava, a basic food source for
millions, contains toxic cyanogenic glycosides; in
Latin America, kidney beans, an extremely
important source of protein, contain toxic
phytohemagglutinin; and in India, the vetch pea, a
popular legume known for hardiness and popular
with
poor
farmers,
contains
dangerous
neurotoxins.43
In other words, ‘natural and traditional’ crops and
technologies are not always safe either. And, to
complete the circle of this discussion (and illustrate
the inherent danger of the Precautionary Principle),
molecular biotechnology might offer solutions to
these problems, e.g. development of genetically
engineered non-cyanogenic glycosidal cassava for
subsistence level agriculture in Africa.
The picture that emerges from the foregoing
observations of either anticipated nonevents or actual
events is that in regulating biotechnologically
produced organisms or technologies, whether
developed via conventional methods (e.g. plant
breeding) or via new technologies (e.g. genetic
engineering), a rational assessment of danger must be
at the heart of risk analysis. Human manipulation of
nature is nothing new, and neither is the attendant
risk.
The hereinabove discussion underscores the
fundamental proposition that the process should not
be the subject of regulation. Instead, the product
should be evaluated, on a case-by-case basis. In
agriculture, the process of ‘traditional’ crop breeding
has not been proven to be inherently safer than
genetic engineering. Indeed, as illustrated so clearly
above, the use of conventional breeding has reintroduced deleterious genes back into cultivated
crops from wild relatives (e.g. the Lenape Potato
Variety).44 The notion that traditional crop breeding is
natural and that genetic engineering is unnatural
simply ignores the facts. Crop scientists have
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employed advanced technologies for years, including
tissue culture, embryo-rescue, radiation breeding and
chemically-induced chromosome doubling, to
produce entirely novel crops, such as triticale, an
artificial hybrid of wheat and rye, a new species that
is not found in nature.45 Molecular techniques have
not yet achieved a similar result, that is, generation of
an entirely new crop species. Hence, it is better to
shift the paradigm: the risk is posed by the organism
itself, regardless of how (e.g. conventional or
molecular crop improvement), or even whether (e.g.
the tropical soda apple cited hereinabove), it has been
modified.46
The Regulation of GMCs: The Law as it Stands
The various laws and regulations that deal with
GMCs are structured such that they regulate the levels
of perceived risk, of course depending on the
jurisdiction the law or regulation is from. Hence, the
American and European paradigms and corresponding
laws and regulations vary accordingly. This section,
therefore, seeks to present a broad overview of these
laws and regulations, and briefly examine some of
them from the perspective of the foregoing
discussion. These laws include both national law and
treaties. After reviewing these laws, the question
accordingly inevitably arises: How can rationally
drafted and implemented rules and regulations
maximize benefits, minimize risks and serve as a
guide for developing, accessing and utilizing these
emerging technologies so as to exploit their full
potential?
Laws governing US regulation of GMCs are
administered via the federal governmental agencies
and their respective regulatory responsibilities. These
include the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Each of
these is briefly discussed in turn.
The FDA regulates feed, food, food additives and
veterinary drugs.47 The review for safety is as to
whether the product is safe to eat. As for GMCs, the
FDA has a voluntary review process, since it deems
GMC derived food products as a priori safe.20 Still
and all, the FDA has reviewed all such products that
are currently on the market. The FDA review seeks to
determine whether the food product is biologically or
nutritionally different from a corresponding food
product that is derived from the non-GMC source.20
The approach to review does not seem to conform to
the strictures of the Precautionary Principle.

The products regulated by the USDA include plant
pests, plants and veterinary biologics. The review for
safety is whether the plant is safe to grow.47 The
USDA seeks to make its regulatory activities as
transparent as possible, as per the statement of the
Clinton Administration’s Secretary of Agriculture
Dan Glickman:4 ‘fostering open, public, and arm’s
length regulatory processes.’ The USDA’s Animal
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), pursuant to
the Plant Protection Act (PPA) functions as the
primary regulator of GMCs.20
The products regulated by the EPA include
microbial/plant-pesticides, new uses of existing
pesticides and novel microorganisms. Hence, with
GMCs, the EPA’s regulatory mandate focuses on
‘biopesticides’, e.g. Bt genetically engineered maize,
cotton, and the potential impact these will have on the
environment.20 EPA’s authority to regulate is pursuant
to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA); environmental use permits are required
if test plots exceed 10 acres.20 The EPA’s review for
safety is whether the GMCs are safe for the
environment as well as whether there is a safe new
use of a companion herbicide.47 The EPA’s approach
to regulation is more systematic than the FDA, as it
sets precise limits on biopesticides:
Such limits are based on product characterization
(how different is this product from its non-GMO
counterpart?), toxicology (how long does it take to
break down in the body once consumed?),
allergenicity (will the protein possibly create an
allergic reaction and therefore require a consumer
label?), non-target organisms (will it affect
organisms or animals that were not intended to be
affected?), environmental fate (how fast will the
protein break down in the soil?), and potential pest
resistance.20
It is important to note that, in addition to federal
regulations, there are also state laws that permit states
to monitor field tests of GMCs.28
The regulatory apparatus in the European Union
(EU) appears to be more stringent than that of the
USA, embracing the fundamentals of the
Precautionary Principle. The EU approach to
regulation of GMCs is based, at least partly on, the
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which states that
‘lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.’ The EU Council
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Directive 90/220, adopted in 1990, formed the
framework by which GMCs regulation is approached;
these include pre-market notification, approval
decision and the labeling requirement.4
In light of the articulated known risks of
biotechnologically modified organisms (as discussed
hereinabove), the specific language of 90/220’s
applicability appears peculiar: ‘[90/220] applies not
only to novel plants, but to all GMOs, which are
defined as organisms ‘in which the genetic material
has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally
by mating and/or recombination’.4 Ergo, the Lenape
potato variety would apparently not be subject to
90/220. Miller and Conko address this peculiar
paradigmatic dichotomy directly:
[B]road scientific consensus holds that agbiotech is
merely an extension, or refinement, of less precise
and less predictable technologies that have long
been used for similar purposes, and the product of
which are generally exempt from case-by-case
review. … Many of these ‘classical’ techniques for
crop improvement, such as wide cross
hybridization and mutation breeding, entail gross
and uncharacterized modifications of the genomes
of established crop plants and commonly introduce
entirely new genes, proteins, secondary
metabolites, and other compounds into the food
supply.48
The EU Directive of March 2001, 2001/18/FC
addresses the release and marketing of GMC
products. This is a case-by-case analysis of each
product released with assessment of the potential
long-term effects: risk to human health, risk to the
environment, whether risk is direct, indirect,
immediate or delayed, and possible cumulative longterm effects.20 As with many international
environmental treaties, the Precautionary Principle is
widely applicable.24
However, a recent development might eventually
be an impetus towards modification of Europe’s
regulatory
stringencies.
The
World
Trade
Organization (WTO), paradoxically a European-based
organization, ruled that the six-year European ban on
genetically engineered crops violates international
trade rules. The WTO ruling, in favour of the United
States, Canada and Argentina, challenged the bans on
specific GMCs put in place by Austria, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy and Luxemburg.49 This issue,
nevertheless, still appears far from resolution, as the
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parties differ significantly on how world trade rules
for biotechnology products should be structured, and
how they can be reconciled with national laws
regulating GMCs.50 Regulation, however, driven by
the uncompromising strictures of a rigorously applied
Precautionary Principle, could result in overregulation, with collateral risks not readily
anticipated:
Overly burdensome regulatory requirements could
negatively impact the crops and traits that are
inherently non-commercial, e.g. subsistence level
agriculture for developing countries. Hence,
ironically, the crops and traits that survive the
regulatory apparatus will be those suited for
industrialized agriculture, while those with valueadded for poor farmers in developing regions will
fall by the wayside.48
Conclusion
The Precautionary Principle as applied in the EU is
likely an overreaction, based, at least in part, on the
public perception and distrust of science and
government regulations. However, a balanced
approach to regulation, based on ‘a clear set of
standards based on science’51 might be at least a step
towards harmonization of the US and EU in terms of
the regulation of GMCs. As a specific example, a set
of proposed principles, put forth by a group of
respected US scientists, for assessing and managing
the risk of allergenicity include:52
avoid the transfer of known allergens,
assume genes from allergenic sources encode for an
allergen unless proven otherwise,
assess the allergenic potential of all introduced
proteins,
where allergens are identified, consider alternative
sources, and
apply the Brazil nut case experience to this
proposed series of guidelines.53
Hence, GMCs should not be specifically segregated
out of an overall regulatory mechanism and placed
into some ‘special’ category. As pointed out above,
the greatest fiascos thus far have only involved nongenetically engineered ‘biotechnologies’, and GMCs
themselves have yet to be implicated in creating any
unwanted externalities of similar magnitude. There is
simply no empirical support for the oft-advanced
proposition that GMCs are inherently more dangerous
than other crops/plants because of the process that is
employed to develop them (i.e. molecular
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biotechnology). Quite the contrary, as illustrated in
this paper non-molecular biotechnologies have
generated the greatest documented mishaps.
Therefore, instead of being viewed as a totally
novel, and hence totally dangerous, method of
biotechnology, technologies to develop GMCs should
be viewed as part of the total package of
biotechnological approaches, all subject to rationallybased, comparative risk assessment and risk
management regulation.54 Integral to this approach is
the regulation of products and not processes, i.e.
organisms and phenotypes themselves and not
regulation based on the methods of research and
development. Hence, regulatory oversight should be
driven by the nature of the organism, regardless of
whether it has been developed with conventional or
molecular methodology, if at all, i.e. noxious/invasive
exotic pests such as the tropical soda apple are
products of nature.55
Molecular techniques are analogous to, and just
another step in, a long history of increasing
sophisticated innovations to improve crops and
advance agriculture for the good of mankind.56 Over
caution, over regulation, and over paranoia will not
serve the increasing humanitarian needs of a growing
global community.
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